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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

:
:

BEN J. WAUNEKA,

Case No.
14306

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with second degree murder in
connection with the death of his wife, Rose, which occurred
at their home in Salt Lake County on January 22, 1975.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried to a jury in the Third District
Court, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding, and was
found guilty of manslaughter, a lesser included offense to
murder in the second degree.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent maintains that the verdict rendered by
the jury was correct and should be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and his wife, Rose, lived at 1229
Stringham Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.

On the night

of January 21, 1975, they both were drinking heavily
(Tr.227,230,232).

Appellant called the police the next

morning, January 22, 1975, at about 10:00 a.m. to report
that his wife appeared to be dead (Tr.32,35)

*

A police and medical examiner investigation
found bloody clothing belonging to the deceased in the
bathroom (Tr.43-44), and revealed that Rose's body was
covered with bruises (Tr.65).

Appellant was charged

with his wife's death and was tried August 25, 1975At trial the prosecution introduced testimony
showing that Rose was afraid of her husband, that he
beat her regularly, and that she felt he would kill
her (Tr.137,138,191,193)• Dr. Serge Moore, the
State Medical Examiner, testified that Rose had 75
bruises over her body and gave his expert opinion that
the injury which caused her death was caused by a fist
and then a fall (Tr.65,75,76,78).
The defense consisted of appellant's testimony
that his wife fell during the night of January 21, 1975,
and that he slapped her only to revive her (Tr.236,242,
243).
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The Court gave a limiting instruction concerning
Rose's statements about her fear of the appellant and the
jury returned a verdict of guilty.

Appellant challenges

the propriety of the statements concerning Rose's fear of
appellant in this appeal.
ARGMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED STATEMENTS MADE
BY THE DECEASED, ROSE WAUNEKA.
The State called two witnesses to establish Rose
Wauneka's state of mind just before her death.

A neighbor,

April Dahl, testified that Rose had come into the grocery
store where April worked five days before her death. April
described Rose as having puffy eyes, and a bruise on her
face (Tr.137).
Rose replied:

When April asked her about her condition
"You call the police for me . . . I can't,

if Ben finds out I called the police, he'll kill me.*
(Tr.138).
The State also called Regina Betonney, a social
worker, to testify.

Regina visited Rose on January 20, 1975,

and stated that Rose had bruises all over her body a M that
she was shaking (Tr.191).

After questions from Regina,

Rose stated that appellant had beaten her (Tr.193), and that
if she left him appellant would kill her (Tr.195).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant objected to this testimony, but it was
with a limiting instruction that it only be considered as
an indication of Rose's state of mind.
The status of testimony admitted for the limited
purpose of showing the state of mind of a deceased declarant
is unclear in Utah.

There are decisions from other juris-

dictions, however, validating the Court's action in the
present case.
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Radabaugh,
471 P.2d 582 (Idaho, 1970), held:
"Evidence tending to show
the mental state of the victim
and ill-feeling or hostility
between decedent and defendant
is admissible." Id* at 586.
In Radabaugh, the challenged testimony related
statements of a deceased victim to the witness concerning
her fear of the defendant.

The court determined that such

testimony was proper.
Bustamonte v. People, 157 Colo. 146, 401 P„2d 597
(1965), is supportive of the decision in Radabaugh. The
Colorado Supreme Court upheld a trial court decision to
admit testimony showing the mental state of the victim.
The Colorado Supreme Court even stated that "to have
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rejected the testimony for the purpose it was offered here
would have been an abuse of discretion. . . . "

Id. at 601.

The Oregon Court of Appeals has likewise voiced
approval of allowing testimony to show a deceased victim's
mental state.

In State v. Shirley, 7 Or.App* 166, 488 P. 2d

1401 (1971), the Oregon Court said concerning challenged
hearsay testimony about a deceased's mental condition:
"The state had a right to show
the state of mind of the victim at
the time of and shortly prior to
the homicide and for that purpose to
show what circumstances as expressed
by the victim contributed thereto."
Id. at 1403.
Appellant correctly states that testimony showing
a declarant victim's fear of the defendant is admissible if
relevant to an issue at trial, especially self-defense, suicide or accident.

See People v. Lew, 68 Cal.2d 774, 441

P.2d 942 (1968), and State v. Goodrich, 546 P.2d 1180 (Idaho,
1976), fn. 7.
Appellant's only defense was that Rose died
accidentally, as a result of a fall.

Rose's statements

of her fear of appellant and the circumstances contributing
to that fear (State v. Shirley, supra) are probative of the
probable cause of her death.
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Moreover, Rose's statements have a special
reliability that justify admission.

As the Supreme Court

of Arizona has succintly explained in State v. Gause, 107
Ariz. 491, 489 P.2d 830 (1971):
"We note that in the cases on this
and related points the courts often
resort to strained logic to attain the
desired result. In determining the
identity of the person committing a
murder, the fact that the victim had
reason to fear the defendant has some
probative value. The indicia of reliability
of the hearsay statements are as certainly
present on the question of identity as
they are on the issue of accident or suicide.
We fail also to grasp the attempted distinction regarding when the state of mind
of the victim is or is not in issue. We
are not impressed with pious instructions
to the jury which tell them to consider the
statements of the victim only for the purpose
of determining the victim's state of mind.
Courts have tended to permit hearsay
to be introduced in evidence when, for some
reason or other, such evidence has a special
reliability. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence
355 § 174. In examining the evidence objected
to here, we find that although it does not
completely fit into any of the well recognized
categories of exceptions to the hearsay rule,
it does have a special reliability.
*

*

*

Let us meet the problem head-on, brush
aside the sophistry, and say that expressions
of fear by a murder victim, though they may
be hearsay, are relevant, have probative value
on the issue of identity, and, when in human
experience they have sufficient reliability,
• thLey saoiLLd be admitted in evidence."
(Emphasis added.)
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matter stated.

The challenged testimony in the instant

case was presented for a permissible and limited purpose—
to show the decedent's state of mind.
People v. Lew, 68 Cal.2d 774, 441 P.2d 942
(1968), does not preclude the use of a decedent's statements.

It poses a two pronged test for admissibility.

Rose's statements in the present case meet that test.
Her statements were not admitted solely to indicate past
conduct of the defendant, Lew, supra at 945.

They also

were more credible and trustworthy than the statements
of the declarant in Lew, supra.
People v. Hamilton, 555 Cal.2d 881, 362 P.2d
473 (1961), is distinguishable from the instant case
on several grounds.

The California Court explained that

the deceased's statements focused primarily on the
defendant's past conduct and state of mind, not her own.
Moreover, the prosecution improperly introduced the
cumulative testimony of nine witnesses.

The court

questioned the reliability of the hearsay statements.
In the present case the statements made by Rose to April
Dahl and Regina Betonney were concerned with her own mental
state.

The statements were made under conditions (her

bruises, injuries, general shaky condition, and the
confidentiality of the situation) which suggested trustworthiness and reliability.

That test is present in
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deals

The testimony held to be error in Commonwealth
v, Lippert, 311 A.2d 586 (Pa. 1973), was hearsay by the
decedent going solely to the past conduct of the defendant
and was not introduced or intended to show the victim's
state of mind.
The state of mind exception was correctly applied
in the present case.

Rose's statements were made under

conditions suggesting credibility.

They were expressive

primarily of her fear of appellant and did not prejudicially
focus on his past conduct.

The statements were relevant

to issues of identity of her murderer and the defense of
accident raised by appellant.

The jury was instructed as

to the narrow purpose for which Rose's declarations had
been admitted.
For the above reasons,respondent submits that the
trial court properly admitted testimony concerning the
deceased's state of mind and appellant's conviction should
therefore be upheld.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED TESTIMONY
DESCRIBING THE DECEDENT'S PHYSICAL APPEARANCE.
Appellant contends that admission of the testimony
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I

speculated as to the cause of the bruises, their testimony
merely related what they observed.

This information is

relevant direct evidence and the jury could draw inferences
from it and determine its weight and they could have been
cross-examined and the accuracy of their observations
challenged.

Also description of Rose's appearance helped

establish the reliability of her declarations that appellant
was beating her (Respondent's Brief, point I ) .
State v. Huggins, 18 Utah 2d 219, 418 P.2d 97 8
(1966) , cited by appellant, is substantially different from
the present case.

In Huggins, the prosecution attempted

to introduce the testimony of a ten year old girl charging
the appellant with a similar offense for which he was
charged.

This proffered testimony was a surprise to the

defense and was accompanied by the trial judge's comment to
the jury that the girl's mother had filed a complaint against
the defendant that morning.
The cumulative effect of the testimony and the
judge's comment was determined to be prejudicial.

In the

instant case, the challenged testimony merely described
the decedent's physical appearance and made no reference
at all to appellant:.

The testimony of April Dahl and Regina

Betonney was relevant, non-prejudicial evidence and was
therefore properly admitted.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE
JURY AND ALLOWING THE JURY TO DETERMINE THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE AND CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES.
The State presented substantial evidence to show
that appellant killed his wife. As this Court stated in
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970),
explaining the effect of circumstantial evidence:
"Nevertheless, that proposition
does not apply to each circumstance
separately, but is a matter within
the prerogative of the jury to determine
from all of the facts and circumstances
shown; and if therefrom they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt, it necessarily
follows that they regarded the evidence
as excluding every other reasonable
hypothesis. Unless upon our review
of the evidence and the reasonable
inferences fairly to be deduced therefrom, it appears that there is no
reasonably basis therein for such a
conclusion, we should not overturn the
verdict."
The total effect of the evidence presented by the State
was to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of
appellant's guilt.

This evidence consisted of the expert

testimony of the state medical examiner, the testimony of
a neighbor, and police.
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The case of State v. Bassett, 27 Utah 2d 272, 495
P.2d 318 (1972), is not applicable to the present case.
In Bassett, the parents of a deceased child were tried and
convicted of involuntary manslaughter.

This Court stated

that "no evidence" was presented at trial indicating the
defendants1 guilt.

Considerable evidence was presented

in the instant case connecting appellant with his wife's
death.

Moreover, in Bassett, the trial court instructed

the jury on a theory of gross negligence even though the
criminal nature of the charge required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In the present case the State proved appellant's
culpability beyond a reasonable doubt by direct and
circumstantial evidence.

The jury was justified in

returning a verdict of guilty.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly admitted statements
by the deceased, Rose Wauneka, for the limited purpose
of showing her state of mind.

The testimony of April

Dahl and Regina Betonney relating the decedent's
physical appearance was properly admitted.

The jury

had sufficient evidence to convict appellant of

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

manslaughter.

Wherefore, appellant's conviction should

be upheld and the actions of the trial court affirmed•
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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